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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study the implications for conference program
commiees of using single-blind reviewing, in which commiee
members are aware of the names and affiliations of paper authors,
versus double-blind reviewing, in which this information is not
visible to commiee members. WSDM 2017, the 10th ACM Inter-
national ACM Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, per-
formed a controlled experiment in which each paper was reviewed
by four commiee members. Two of these four reviewers were
chosen from a pool of commiee members who had access to au-
thor information; the other two were chosen from a disjoint pool
who did not have access to this information. is information
asymmetry persisted through the process of bidding for papers, re-
viewing papers, and entering scores. Reviewers in the single-blind
condition typically bid for 22% fewer papers, and preferentially bid
for papers from top institutions. Once papers were allocated to re-
viewers, single-blind reviewers were significantly more likely than
their double-blind counterparts to recommend for acceptance pa-
pers from famous authors and top institutions. e estimated odds
multipliers are 1.63 for famous authors and 1.58 and 2.10 for top
universities and companies respectively, so the result is tangible.
For female authors, the associated odds multiplier of 0.78 is not sta-
tistically significant in our study. However, a meta-analysis places
this value in line with that of other experiments, and in the con-
text of this larger aggregate the gender effect is also statistically
significant.
1 INTRODUCTION
e scientific peer-review process dates back to the 1600’s, and is
generally regarded as a cornerstone of the scientific method. e
details of its implementation have been scrutinized and explored
across many academic disciplines.
Peer review has many dimensions. At the present time, there is
a conversation underway throughout the scientific community re-
garding open peer review, which covers a range of practices ranging
from revealing reviewer names to authors to making peer reviews
available to the general public, with orwithout the reviewer’s name
aached. In the last 2–3 decades there have been numerous tri-
als of open peer review. Perhaps most visible is a long-running
experiment by the journal Nature. Aer lukewarm initial experi-
ences [14], a decade later Nature now reports 60% of reviewers are
comfortable with their reviews becoming public, given the right
of the reviewer to withhold his or her name [3]. While this im-
portant trend continues to generate lively discussion, we do not
discuss open peer review further in this paper.
Rather, our focus is on the question of availability to reviewers
of information about the authors. is question remains an active
area of debate, with many significant conferences and journals on
each side of the question. Terminology is not completely uniform
across the sciences, but following common usage in computer sci-
ence, we refer to single-blind reviewing as the practice of making
reviewers aware of author identity but not the other way around.
In double-blind reviewing, neither party is aware of the identity of
the other.
Numerous anecdotal studies argue for one form or the other of
peer review, oen based on observations of findings before and
aer switching models. A much smaller number of researchers
have performed controlled studies of the effects of the two models.
Notable among these is the work of Rebecca Blank from 1991 [1],
who performed a beautiful controlled study in reviewing papers
submied to the American Economic Review over a two-year pe-
riod from 1987 to 1989. We discuss this and other related work in
some detail below.
e current work came aboutwhen two of the authors of this pa-
per were asked to co-chair the program of WSDM 2017, the 10th
International ACM Conference on Web Search and Data Mining.
WSDM has for its entire history employed single-blind reviewing.
We were asked to consider switching to double-blind this year.
Upon a review of the literature, we discovered that earlier con-
trolled experiments in the journal seing missed many key aspects
of the standard WSDM reviewing process, while many discussions
of conferences switching between reviewing methods were uncon-
trolled experiments in the sense that the switch took place from
one year to the next, introducing an analytically intractable set of
possible confounding factors. Hence, we decided to perform an
experiment in order to make an informed recommendation to the
chairs of WSDM 2018, and to offer our findings to the rest of the
community.
We now summarize some differences between conference and
journal reviewing processes. As a backdrop, we observe that the
accelerated pace of computer science in recent decades has led to
the ascendance of academic conferences as a primary means for
dissemination of new results. e level of formal methodologi-
cal scrutiny applied to the conference paper acceptance process
is therefore lower than it is for peer-reviewed journals. Some ele-
ments that are common in the process of conference reviewing are
less common in a journal review seing, for instance:
• Conference review processes oen run on an annual cycle,
which results in large number of papers being reviewed by
a large pool of reviewers on a single operating schedule.
• As a result, many conferences operate at a scale thatmakes
it difficult for each paper to be matched by an expert to ex-
pert reviewers.
• e assignment of reviewers to papers is therefore per-
formed using othermechanisms. Inmany cases, reviewers
are asked to indicate ability or interest in reviewing each
paper as input to the assignment process. is process is
referred to as bidding.
• Each reviewer typically reviews a batch of papers, with a
single deadline for completing all reviews.
• Final decisions are oenmadewith constraints on the over-
all number of slots, rather than on a notional quality stan-
dard.
• Decisions are accept or reject; there is typically no option
for re-review aer revision.1
ese differences are not hard and fast rules, but the conference
seing does raise different questions about best practices.
In the WSDM seing, we find significant differences between
single-blind and double-blind reviewing. First, we find that single-
blind reviewers enter about 22% fewer bids on average, a highly
significant decrease (Mann-Whitney U, p = .0002). We show that,
given these fewer bids, there is a significant preference to bid on
papers from top universities and companies, compared to double-
blind reviewers (p = 0.011 and p = 0.010 respectively).
Once the bids have been received, papers are allocated to review-
ers, and wemay study the resulting review scores. We find that the
likelihood for single-blind reviewers to enter a positive review is
significantly higher for papers with a famous author (p = 0.027)
and for papers from a top university (p = 0.012) or a top company
(p = 0.002) compared to double-blind reviewers. e estimated
odds multipliers are 1.63, 1.58 and 2.10 respectively, equivalent to
increases in underlying quality of 0.57 to 0.92 standard deviations.
e effect is strong enough to warrant serious discussion on the
appropriate reviewing policy.
Our findings with respect to bidding imply that reviewers bid
less under single-blind reviewing. is reduced bid landscape may
result in a lower–quality allocation of papers to knowledgeable re-
viewers. It may also be disadvantageous if it results in an “unfair”
bidding pool, in favor of papers from top institutions. It is an ethics
and policy question to determine whether a reviewer who (let us
imagine) implicitly uses information about the quality of the pa-
per’s institution to estimate that the paper is more interesting, and
hence enters a more positive bid on that paper, is acting in a man-
ner that should be discouraged.
Our findings with respect to reviewing raise similar questions.
A reviewer who knows that a particular paper is from a top school,
or has a famous author, is significantly more likely to recommend
acceptance than a reviewer who does not know this information.
ere are at least two points for consideration here. e first is that
the two reviewers are not identical: reviewers that bid on a paper
are more likely to be assigned to review the paper, and as we have
already discussed, the bidding dynamics of the two reviewers are
different. Hence, it is possible that the single-blind reviewer of
a particular paper may have bid on the paper due to knowledge
of the author’s prior work, while the double-blind reviewer may
have bid due to the topic of the paper implied by the title. In other
1Some conferences add a “rebual” or “author feedback” round aer reviewing is
complete to allow authors to respond to reviewer comments or describe changes that
will appear in the final revision. Additionally, if a strong paper has an addressable
flaw, some conferences will “accept with shepherding” appointing a knowledgeable
party to verify that the flaw has been addressed. WSDM does not use rebual, and
very rarely uses shepherding.
words, paper assignment in not random, and this should be taken
into account in interpreting our findings.
Our second point with respect to reviewing is that, whatever
the process that resulted in the reviewers being assigned the pa-
per, the single-blind reviewers with knowledge of the authors and
affiliations are much more positive regarding papers from famous
authors and top institutions. Again the implications are not cut
and dried, but it is reasonable to raise the concern that authors
who are not famous and not from a top institution may see lower
likelihood for acceptance of exactly the same work.
In Section 6, we perform ameta-analysis of our study alongwith
six other experimental studies from the literature. Our findings in
this meta-analysis are as follows. First, with respect to famous au-
thors, our effect is in fact smaller than the aggregate. For top 50 in-
stitutions, only one study covered this effect, and showed a smaller
effect than ours. With respect to female authors, our effect ranks
7th out of 11 measurements, but is not qualitatively different than
that observed by other authors. By the standards of meta-analysis,
in aggregate, the effect against female authors can be considered
statistically significant.
We therefore recommend for upcomingWSDMconferences that
the program chairs strongly consider moving to an overall policy
of double-blind reviewing.
2 RELATED WORK
ere is extensive literature on scientific peer reviewing overall,
and on single-blind versus double-blind reviewing in particular. A
survey of Snodgrass [21] reviews over 600 separate pieces of liter-
ature on reviewing.
For detailed information, we refer to reader to the excellent sur-
vey of Snodgrass [21] and additional survey material referenced
there. For editorial perspective, see Snodgrass [22], McKinley [11,
12], or for an argument that the benefits of double-blind reviewing
are small compared to the costs, see Schulzrinne [20].
Regarding the peer reviewing landscape, Walker and Rocha da
Silva [26] argue that the so sciences more commonly apply double-
blind review, while in the natural sciences single-blind review is
more common. Multiple journals and conferences are moving to
double-blind review (see below for some results studying the change-
over in those venues). In some cases the movement is in the other
direction, for example theAmerican EconomicAssociation announced
in 2011 that it will end double-blind review, citing difficulty of
maintaining anonymity and decreased information for reviewers
(for example, to assess authors’ possible conflicts of interest) [6].
2.1 Specific biases described in the literature
A number of specific biases are described in the literature. We will
focus here on literature related to three biases we consider in our
study: gender, prestige, and institution of the authors.
Knobloch-Westerwick et al. [7] propose the Matilda effect, in
which papers from male first authors are evaluated to have greater
scientific merit than papers from female first authors, particularly
in male-dominated fields. e authors study this effect by ran-
domly assigning names to conference abstracts, and then asking
study participants for assessments of merit. Studies disagree on
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the presence of gender bias in reviewing: many studies find ef-
fects, but many of these are retrospective studies of venues that
have moved to double-blind reviewing, and hence cannot rule out
the possibility that the findings are due to improving gender equal-
ity rather than the reviewing model itself. Our study does not find
a statistically significant gender effect. However, in our field there
are no fixed conventions for “first authors” so we simply study the
presence of a female author on the paper, which may weaken the
effect. Blank’s study [1] shows a small difference depending on
first author gender, but the data volume is low and the difference
is not statistically significant.
Work by Robert Merton [13] in 1968 proposed the Mahew ef-
fect, in which already-famous researchers receive the lion’s share
of recognition for new work. e paper provides an enlightening
survey of this effect through contemporary and historical science,
and cites various psychological processes that may be at work.
ere has been significant follow-on work in this area; see for in-
stance the discussion of reviewing at the ACM SIGMOD confer-
ence below.
Finally, Blank’s study [1] spends significant time discussing bi-
ases resulting from the fame or quality of the authors’ institution(s).
2.2 Retrospective studies
In 2001, the journal Behavioral Ecology switched from single-blind
to double-blind review. Budden et al. [2] describe their findings
analyzing data before and aer the switch. ey found an increase
in female first-authored papers aer the change. Webb et al. [27],
however, argue that comparable journals that did not switch re-
viewing model also showed such an increase over a similar time
period.
Roberts and Verhoef [18] study double-blind reviewing at the
Evolution of Language conference series, comparing the results in
2016, which used double-blind reviewing, to the results of 2012
and 2014, which used single-blind reviewing. e authors showed
a significant effect for gender, in which papers with female first au-
thors and male first authors were accepted with similar likelihood
under single-blind reviewing, but female first-author papers were
accepted with higher likelihood under double-blind reviewing.
In 2001, the ACM SIGMOD conference on management of data
moved to double-blind reviewing. Aer five years in the newmodel,
Madden and DeWi [10] asked whether double-blind reviewing
helped junior researchers who might have been disadvantaged un-
der single-blind reviewing. ey studied the acceptance rate of
more senior authors before and aer the reviewing change. eir
study showed no difference on acceptances before and aer the
reviewing change. However, a follow-on study by Tung [24] ana-
lyzing the same data using a more standard statistical test showed
the opposite result.
2.3 Experimental studies
Peters and Ceci [16] performed a notorious study of reproducibil-
ity of peer review results. e authors of the study asked for and
received permission from the authors of twelve prestigious papers
to re-submit these papers to the journal in which they appeared,
introducing false author names and referencing manufactured low-
prestige institutions (e.g., the “Northern Plains Center for Research” ).
3 of 38 editors and reviewers detected the re-submission, so only
9 of the papers were reviewed fully. Of those, 8 were rejected, of-
ten citing serious methodological flaws. In addition to raising con-
cerns about the ethics of peer reviewing practices, the study itself
gained additional notoriety in part because an ethical debate arose
regarding the propriety of the methodology; the authors provide
an insightful discussion of the history [17].
e study of Peters and Ceci was publishedwith significant com-
mentary from many fields, and is frequently referenced in policy
discussions. In addition to the authors’ original intent of under-
standing the importance of reputation in acceptance decisions, the
findings also raised questions about the overall reproducibility of
acceptance decisions. Rothwell and Martyn [19] went on to study
this question, and found in their seing that reviewers did not
agree with one another regarding a manuscript beer than ran-
dom chance would indicate. In Computer Science, the Neural In-
formation Processing Systems (NIPS) conference subsequently ran
an experiment in which a subset of papers were sent through two
parallel review processes. eir findings [8, 9] show that, if the
commiee were to re-select papers again, 38–64% of the papers
would have been accepted again. We discuss this question in Sec-
tion 5.3.3.
Perhaps the best known experimental study of single-blind ver-
sus double-blind reviewing behavior, and to our knowledge the
only controlled experiment in this area other than our own, is the
study of Rebecca Blank [1]. Over several years, 1498 papers were
randomly assigned to single-blind versus double-blind reviewing
condition. While Blank performs detailed analyses of many facets
of the data, wemay summarize part of the high-level findings as fol-
lows. First, authors at top or boom institutions do not see signifi-
cant differences in acceptance decisions based on reviewing model,
but authors at mid-tier institutions perform beer in a single-blind
seing, as do foreign authors and those outside academia. Second,
there is a mild indication, not statistically significant, that women
do slightly beer in double-blind review.
Recently, Okike et al. [15] performed an ingenious study con-
structing an artificial submission proposing a study of the efficacy
of training to improve communication in the operating room. e
fabricated study was submied to an Orthopaedics journal, and
listed as authors two past presidents of the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons. With the involvement of the journal, the
study was sent to 256 reviewers, of whom 119 completed the re-
view, split between single-blind and double-blind conditions. e
results showed that single-blind reviewers were significantly more
favorable toward the paper.
2.4 Difficulties implementing double-blind
reviewing
Hill and Provost [5] study the problem of automatically identifying
the authors of a double-blind paper. ey show fully automated
techniques to identify authors with 40–50% accuracy, and 80% ac-
curacy for highly prolific authors with 100 or more prior publica-
tions. Section 5.4.1 discusses this issue in more detail.
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3 EXPERIMENT
In this section we describe the design of our experiment. We begin
with an overview of the reviewing process WSDM has typically
employed in the past:
(1) Program chairs invite program commiee (PC) and senior
program commiee (SPC) members while authors submit
papers.
(2) PC and SPC members bid on each paper, specifying which
are of interest.
(3) Program chairs perform an assignment of 3–4 PC mem-
bers and one SPC member to each paper, typically result-
ing in 6–10 papers assigned to each PC member.
(4) PC members complete reviews of assigned papers.
(5) For each paper, the assigned SPC member conducts a dis-
cussion with the PC members reviewing the paper and
makes a recommendation for or against acceptance.
(6) Based on all this information, the program chairs make
final decisions.
3.1 Ethical Considerations in Designing the
Experiment
We spent significant time in discussion about the most appropriate
design for our experiment, given the many ethical considerations,
and we were fortunate to receive valuable input and discussions
from the conference general chairs, theWSDM steering commiee,
and the Ethics Commiee for Information Sciences (ECIS) at the
University of Amsterdam and the VU University Amsterdam.
rough this discussion, we adopted two ethical principles in
our design of the experiment:
Principle 1. No-Bias Condition A paper’s likelihood of accep-
tance should not change based on its experimental condition.
Principle 2. Veracity ConditionWe will not lie to any partici-
pant in the experiment.
e first principle in particular put significant constraints on
possible experimental designs, as described in Section 3.2.
Our Call for Papers [23] asks authors to submit PDF documents
that have been anonymized by removing references to the authors
and their institutions. e CFP does not commit to a particular
reviewing model. e relevant section reads as follows: “As an
experiment this year, WSDM 2017 will use a combination of single-
blind reviewing and double-blind reviewing. Please contact the PC
chairs at the address below for any questions on the submission or
review process.”
3.2 Design of Experiment
We did not see an experimental design that tested the end-to-end
decision process in a way that is consistent with the two ethical
principles above. Hence, we ran the experiment through the end
of the PC reviewing phase, and terminated the experiment before
beginning the discussion or final decision phases. e experiment
considered only the behavior of the PC, not the SPC. Our findings
therefore relate just to bidding, reviewing, and scoring by PCmem-
bers. e experimental design is described in Figure 1.
(1) Program commiee is split randomly into two
groups of equal size: single-blind PC (SBPC) and
double-blind PC (DBPC).
(2) During bidding, SBPC see author names and affilia-
tions, while DBPC do not. Both groups see paper ti-
tles and abstracts. Otherwise, the bidding interface
is the same.
(3) A separate assignment is computed for SBPC and
DBPC using the standard assignment algorithm pro-
vided by the EasyChair conference management sys-
tem. e overall assignment allocates 4 PCmembers
to each paper with exactly 2 from SBPC and 2 from
DBPC.
(4) e assigned papers are sent for reviewing. SBPC
and DBPC again receive the same reviewing form,
except that SBPC members see author names and af-
filiations in the reviewing form. PDF documents do
not include author names or affiliations.
(5) Aer reviews are received, the experiment is closed,
and the data is set aside for analysis. From this
point forward, all PC members operate in a single-
blind condition. Discussions are managed by the
SPC member assigned to each paper, in which all 4
PC members are now able to see the author names
and affiliations for the paper.
Figure 1: Experiment Design
Note that our goal is not to determine whether a particular pa-
per is more likely to be accepted in single-blind or double-blind re-
viewing. e variance in any single decision is too large tomeasure
this directly (see Section 5.3.3 for some elaboration on this point).
Instead, we wish to measure statistical differences in the overall
behavior of SBPC and DBPC. ese differences may be measured
in the context of particular classes of papers (papers from top-tier
institutions, papers with female authors, etc) or particular classes
of paper/reviewer pairs (reviewer from the same country as the
paper, etc).
Due to the design, we may study the impact of single-blind ver-
sus double-blind reviewing on the bidding process, and on how
reviewers score papers. We can show whether papers wrien by
a particular gender are more likely to receive bids and more likely
to receive higher review scores in the single-blind or double-blind
condition. We cannot see how the reviewing model impacts SPC
recommendations or final paper acceptances. However, we felt
that if significant behavioral differences exist, we should observe
this in the experiment.
We considered and rejected a number of alternative approaches
to the experiment, including the following:
(1) Spliing papers between a single-blind and a double-blind
condition. We rejected this approach because authors could
reasonably argue that being placed in a particular condi-
tion could have reduced their likelihood of acceptance.
(2) Spliing each reviewer into some single-blind and some
double-blind reviews. We rejected this approach because
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it is not well-defined how to perform bidding in this set-
ting, and also because it would implicitly force reviewers
to compare their behavior with respect to the two groups
of paper, which might introduce biases.
(3) Removing reference to the experiment from the CFP and
our communications with reviewers. We rejected this ap-
proach because we felt it would entail at some level lying
to both authors and reviewers about the process.
(4) Sending a small number of papers through both a single-
blind and double-blind condition in parallel. We performed
rough calculations to infer that we would not have suffi-
cient statistical strength in this approach to make clean
statements about the outcomes. We also were concerned
that any reasonable scheme to fuse the results of the two
decision processes would be inconsistent with our no-bias
principle.
4 DATA
In this section, we describe the data available from our experiment.
Each reviewer in the experiment performed two tasks: bidding for
papers, and then reviewing a set of assigned papers.
During bidding, each reviewer considered the submied papers
and entered a bid for each. ree bids are possible: yes, maybe, no.2
If a reviewer takes no action with respect to a paper, the default bid
is no.
We used the EasyChair conference management tool. A reviewer
in the bidding process is presented with EasyChair’s standard bid-
ding page. is shows the title of each paper on a separate row.
Single-blind reviewers also see the authors before the paper title,
with hyperlinks to each author’s homepage if available. Institu-
tions are not shown at this stage. ere is a link to see details of the
paper, and another link to download the full paper itself. e de-
tails page provides some additional information, such as keywords,
the abstract for the paper, and for single-blind reviewers, the list
of authors with affiliations. e PDF document itself does not list
authors or their affiliations.
e distribution of bids per reviewer is shown in Table 1. e
table shows that 60% of reviewers have at least 20 bids, which is
a reasonable number to perform an effective allocation of papers.
We will discuss below (in Section 5.2) the observation that single-
blind reviewers appear to enter more reviews.
Per the experiment design in Section 3, we then use EasyChair’s
standard tools to allocate exactly two double-blind reviewers and
two single-blind reviewers to each paper. Once these paper as-
signments are complete, each reviewer is directed to a page listing
his/her assigned papers. is page lists the title of the paper, with
links to download the paper and see additional information. Single-
blind reviewers see the authors here, and may see the affiliations
on the additional information page.
e submied papers themselves are all anonymized, so author
and affiliation information is not available in the PDF document.
Due to some mid-stream withdrawls, the number of papers in
consideration at the end of the experiment was exactly 500. Of
these, 453 have four reviews and 47 have three reviews.
2ere is a fourth value to indicate a conflict of interest, but we do not consider these
bids here; we consider them separately in Section 5.3.5.
Num
bids
Single
blind
reviewers
Double
blind
reviewers
Common
1-CDF
Count CDF Count CDF
0–4 6 5% 4 3.3% 100%
5–9 9 12.4% 7 9.1% 96%
10–14 24 23.2% 13 19.8% 89%
15–19 21 49.6% 13 30.6% 74%
20–24 21 66.9% 15 43.0% 60%
25–29 25 87.6% 44 79.3% 45%
30–34 9 95% 11 88.4% 17%
>= 40 6 100% 14 100% 8%
Table 1: Distribution of number of bids for single-blind and
double-blind reviewers. 1-CDF is computed over the union
of single-blind and double-blind bids.
Value Score Description
Strong
accept
6
I think this paper is well above
the bar and will fight for it
Accept 3
I think this paper should be
accepted
Borderline -2
I think this paper is below the bar,
but am open to accept if there
is strong support
Reject -4 I think this paper should be rejected
Strong
reject
-6
I think this paper is well below the
bar and will fight against it
Table 2: Reviewers selecteda score for each paper from these
options.
4.1 Score and Rank information from
reviewers
Reviewers used a standard form to enter reviews. is form in-
cludes various fields for textual information, but also includes two
fields to which we pay special aention in this study: score and
rank. Score represents an overall recommendation for the paper,
while rank represents a relative judgment of the paper compared
to others reviewed by the same reviewer.
WSDM 2017 used asymmetric scoring, so the reviewers select
one of the score values shown in Table 2. Likewise, reviewers select
one of values in Table 3 for the rank of the paper. e rank values
are not checked for consistency—it is for instance possible to rank
all papers as the top paper, althoughwe did not see such anomalies.
4.2 Metadata for Implicit Bias Analysis
For our analysis, we generate some additional metadata as part of
our exploration of the behavior of single-blind versus double-blind
reviewers. First, we aempt to compute a country for each paper as
the plurality value of this property across the authors of the paper.
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Value Description
4 Top paper in my batch
3 Top 25% in my batch
2 Top 50% in my batch
1 Boom 50% in my batch
Table 3: Reviewers selected a rank for each paper from these
options.
at is, if there is a single country with strictly more authors than
any other country (even if this is not a majority), we declare this
to be the country of the paper.
For each (reviewer, paper) pair, we compute the following six
boolean covariates:
(1) Academic paper. We hand-wrote a set of rules to deter-
mine whether an author’s institution is academic or not
(corporate, governmental, non-profit, unaffiliated, are all
considered non-academic institutions). If a strict majority
of the authors are from an academic institution, we con-
sider the paper to be an academic paper.
(2) Female author. We aempt to determine if at least one
of the paper’s authors is female. Earlier work typically
considered papers whose first author was female, but sub-
missions to WSDM do not always follow the same con-
ventions for first authors, so we did not have a reliable
way to determine if one author contributed more than an-
other. Hence, we consider papers with a female author
versus papers with no female author.3 To make this deter-
mination, we manually annotated the gender of the 1491
authors. We found 1197 male authors, 246 female authors,
and 48 authors for whom we could not determine gender
from online searches.
(3) Paper from USA. is feature is true if the country of the
paper as defined above is the USA.
(4) Famous author. We define a famous author to be an au-
thor with at least 3 accepted papers at earlier WSDM con-
ferences [28], and at least 100 papers according to dblp
records. ere are 57 such authors. is property is true
if the paper has at least one famous author.
(5) Same country as reviewer. We wished to study whether
knowledge of the authorswould allow a reviewer from the
same country to treat the paper preferentially. is feature
is true if the country of the paper as defined above is the
same as the country of the reviewer as provided during
the EasyChair registration process.
(6) Top university. We define top universities as the top 50
global computer science universities.4 While this choice
is imperfect, the universities align reasonably well with
our expectations for top universities.
(7) Top companies. We define top companies as Google, Mi-
croso, Yahoo!, and Facebook. is property is true if any
author is from a top company.
3In Section 5.3.1 we consider other alternatives to this approach.
4Per topuniversities.com
Factor
Feature
name
Number of
papers
Fraction of
papers
Paper from USA usa 176 35%
Same country
as reviewer
same 146 29%
Female author wom 219 44%
Famous author fam 81 16%
Academic aca 370 74%
Top university uni 135 27%
Top company com 90 18%
Table 4: Summary of features and prevalence.
Table 4 gives information on the distribution for each of these
features.
4.3 Blinded Paperality Score
For our analysis, we need a proxy measure for the intrinsic quality
of each paper. e rationale for this is twofold: (a) e primary
task of the reviewers is to rate paper quality and we want to repre-
sent this null hypothesis in the feature set. In this sense, implicit
biases would be those effects that are present above and beyond
that accounted for by the quality of the paper itself. (b) Almost
by definition, implicit biases are second-order effects. By directly
measuring intrinsic quality, we can reduce the background noise
and more easily detect the presence of any second-order effects.
We construct this paper quality score from the blinded raters
by combining linearly their scores and ranks, here standardized to
have zero mean and unit variance. Among the blinded reviewers,
the correlation between these two measures is 0.75, and principal
components would combine these with equal weights. However,
we choose tomaximize the correlation between the pairs of blinded
reviewers of the same paper. For a given score s and rank r , this
between-reviewer correlation is maximized by a quality score q =
s+0.111r . e achieved correlation between the two blinded raters
is 0.38, a point to which we return in Section 5.3.3.
We take the quality score of a paper to be the average quality
score of the double-blind reviews for that paper, referred to below
as bpqs, for blinded paper quality score. We normalize bqps to
have unit standard deviation.
4.4 Bid Attractiveness Scores: Bids by Reviewer
and Bids by Paper
By analogy with bpqs, for modeling bid behavior we develop two
first-order scores. To encode the willingness of a particular re-
viewer to bid, we calculate the total bids of that reviewer; we refer
to this score as bbr, the bids by reviewer. In order to score the in-
trinsic bid-aractiveness of the paper, we calculate the total num-
ber of bids on this paper by the double-blind reviewers; we refer
to this score as bbp, the bids by paper. In modeling bids, we will
employ both these scores as covariates.
5 ANALYSIS
We now present our analysis of the experimental data described in
Section 4.
6
Name Coeff. Stderr
Conf.
interval
p-value
Odds
mult.
bpqs
equiv.
const -1.83 0.24 [-2.31,-1.36] 0.000 0.16 -
bpqs 0.80 0.08 [0.64,0.97] 0.000 2.23 1.00
com 0.74 0.24 [0.27,1.21] 0.002 2.10 0.92
fam 0.49 0.22 [0.05,0.93] 0.027 1.63 0.61
uni 0.46 0.18 [0.09,0.83] 0.012 1.58 0.57
wom -0.25 0.18 [-0.60,0.10] 0.160 0.78 -0.31
same 0.14 0.24 [-0.34,0.62] 0.564 1.15 0.17
aca 0.06 0.22 [-0.38,0.51] 0.775 1.07 0.08
usa 0.01 0.21 [-0.42,0.44] 0.964 1.01 0.01
Table 5: Learned coefficients and significance for review
score prediction.
5.1 Modeling reviews
Our modeling approach is to predict the likelihood that a single-
blind reviewer will give a positive (accept) score to a paper, using
the following multinomial logistic regression model:
Pr[score > 0]
Pr[score <= 0]
= e 〈Θ,v 〉.
where Θ is a set of learned parameters, and v is a vector of fea-
tures consisting of a constant offset feature, the overall paper qual-
ity score bpqs defined in Section 4.3 (a first-order feature), and the
six implicit bias booleans in Table 4 (second-order features).
We present the results of the logistic regression in Table 5. ere
are significant non-zero weights for the fam (p = .027), uni (p =
.012) and com (p = 0.002) features. e corresponding odds mul-
tipliers are 1.63 for fam, 1.58 for uni, and 2.10 for com. e other
features do not show significant effects.
Our hypothesis in undertaking the work was that it would be
very difficult to see any effects on review behavior given the scale
of the data, and the difficulty other studies have encountered in
finding significant biases for single-blind reviewing. us, wewere
surprised to encounter three significant effects with substantial
odds multipliers.
e ratio of these coefficients can also be compared to the 0.80
coefficient of bpqs; the result measures effect size relative to the
underlying quality of bpqs. e ratio for fam, uni and com corre-
spond to shis of 0.61, 0.57, and 0.92 standard deviations respec-
tively. For wom, the odds multiplier of 0.78, equivalent to −0.31
bpqs standard deviations, is not statistically significant (p = 0.16).
5.2 Modeling bids
We take a similar approach to modeling bids, but some changes are
required, as a reviewer may bid for an arbitrary number of papers.
As Table 1 suggests, the first question we should reasonably
ask is whether single-blind and double-blind reviewers bid for the
same number of papers. We test this using a Mann-Whitney test,
and find that single-blind reviewers bid formore papers (p=0.0002).
On average, single-blind reviewers bid for 19.9 papers compared to
24.9 for double-blind reviewers, a decrease of 22%.
us, the difference in behavior between the two reviewer classes
is quite significant. We now ask a follow-on question: given that
single-blind reviewers bid more, do they bid more for particular
Name Coeff. Stderr
Conf.
interval
p-value
Odds
mult.
const -4.87 0.08 [-5.04,-4.71] 0.000 0.01
bbr 0.05 0.00 [0.04,0.05] 0.000 1.05
bbp 0.08 0.00 [0.07,0.09] 0.000 1.09
com 0.16 0.06 [0.04,0.28] 0.010 1.17
uni 0.12 0.05 [0.03,0.22] 0.011 1.13
fam 0.07 0.06 [-0.06,0.19] 0.287 1.07
wom 0.05 0.04 [-0.04,0.14] 0.268 1.05
usa 0.02 0.05 [-0.07,0.11] 0.681 1.02
aca 0.01 0.06 [-0.10,0.12] 0.881 1.01
Table 6: Learned coefficients and significance for bid predic-
tion.
types of papers? To answer this question, we pursue a similar anal-
ysis to our regression study of review scores. However, rather than
including an overall paper quality score (bpqs) into the regression,
we instead include covariates for the bid-appetite of the reviewer
(bbr) and the bid-aractiveness of the paper (bbp) as described in
Section 4.4. We retain the constant offset term.
e results are shown in Table 6. In addition to the difference
in likelihood to bid, we also see that the uni feature is significant
(p = 0.011), as is the com feature (p = 0.010), indicating that the
bids entered by single-blind reviewers tend to favor top universi-
ties and companies, with modest odds multipliers of 1.13 and 1.17
respectively.
5.3 Additional analysis
5.3.1 The Matilda effect. As described in Section 2, there is sig-
nificant work regarding the importance of author gender in re-
viewing. Some of this work clearly points to lower assessments
of scientific merit for work purportedly authored by women. For
both bidding and reviewing, we do not see a behavior difference
between single-blind and double-blind reviewers for papers with
a female author.
We re-ran the same logistic regression analysis from two addi-
tional perspectives: papers whose first author is female (16.4% of
papers), and papers wrien by a strict majority of female authors
(3.8% of papers). In both cases, we do not see a significant p-value
for the wom feature. We therefore do not see evidence that gen-
der of authors influences bidding or reviewing behavior. However,
Section 6 shows meta-analysis studying our results in the context
of other results from the literature, and in this seing we do find
an overall significant gender effect.
5.3.2 Aggregate review statistics. We checked the lengths of re-
views along with the distribution of scores and ranks across the
single-blind and double-blind conditions. e results are shown in
Table 7. Average review length for single-blind reviewers is 2073
characters versus 2061 for double-blind, not significantly longer
for either condition by Mann-Whitney test (p=0.81). Scores and
ranks show a similar paern, with no significant difference in ei-
ther score or rank distribution.
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Measure
Single
blind
average
Double
blind
average
Mann-Whitney
p-value
Review length 2073 2061 0.81
Reviewer score -2.07 -1.90 0.51
Reviewer rank 1.89 1.87 0.52
Table 7: Aggregate comparison of review statistics.
5.3.3 Reviewer agreement. A standard argument suggests that
single-blind reviewers would correlate slightly beer than double-
blind reviewers, for instance because they would tend to share a
preference for papers by famous authors.
Although our study has focused on implicit biases of reviewers,
the lack of agreement among reviewers is also notable. In part, this
can be mitigated by using more than one reviewer. e inter-rater
reliability associated with an average of n raters sharing correla-
tion ρ has correlation
√
nR/(1 + nR) where R = ρ2/(1 − ρ2) is the
ratio of explained to unexplained variance.
For example, the inter-reviewer correlation for bpqs is 0.38, which
corresponds to having benefit and inaccuracy of n = 1 reviewer
per paper. Under our current protocol we have n = 2 blinded re-
viewers, and the operative correlation is 0.5. WereWSDM to enact
double-blinded review, we would have at our disposal n = 4 re-
viewers and the operative correlation would be 0.63, while n = 5
and 6 achieve correlations of 0.68 and 0.71 respectively. Correla-
tions of 0.6 characterize imperfect human-based measurement sys-
tems, and are common enough in contexts where the low-value
material has been excluded from human assessment.
In summary, we recommend that conference organizers be cog-
nizant of the inter-reviewer agreement that their review process
provides, and choose appropriately the number of reviews that
each paper receives.
5.3.4 Changes during discussion. Finally, wemay ask what hap-
pens aer the experiment concludes and the discussion phase be-
gins. During this phase is it common to see some changes in re-
view scores. We analyzed these scores, and saw 32 changes to
scores entered by single-blind reviewers compared to 41 changes
to scores entered by double-blind reviewers. is difference is not
significant (Fisher-Exact, p=0.28). We compared the changes in
scores to determine whether double-blind reviewers tend to have
changes of larger magnitude than single-blind reviewers. e dis-
tributions of score changes are not significantly different (Mann-
Whitney, p=0.58). We then checked whether double-blind review-
ers tend to move more in the direction of the initial mean score
than single-blind reviewers aer discovering the authors of the pa-
per. Here also, we find no difference in the magnitude of shis
towards the mean (Mann-Whitney, p=0.58). Hence, during the dis-
cussion phase, aer the authors have been revealed, we cannot con-
clude that the initially double-blind reviewers behave differently
from single-blind reviewers.
5.3.5 Conflicts of interest. It is natural to hypothesize that in a
double-blind seing there will be fewer declared conflicts of inter-
est, as reviewers will not recognize possible conflicts. In WSDM
2017, the EasyChair tool automatically (but imperfectly) detects
conflicts based on the email domains of authors and reviewers. Re-
viewers may specify additional conflicts as they bid for papers. It
is possible to configure the system to allow authors to specify con-
flicts with PC members at submission time, but we did not enable
this configuration.
We consider the overall set of conflicts generated both automat-
ically by EasyChair and by reviewer specification. We find that
the total number of reviewers expressing a conflict (59/121 in the
single-blind seing versus 47/121 in the double-blind seing) is not
significantly different (Fisher-Exact, p=0.35). Likewise, the number
of conflicts expressed by those reviewers who express a conflict is
not significant (Mann-Whitney, p=0.63). Hence, in the seings we
adopted, we do not see that double-blind reviewing introduces a
significant difference in expression of conflicts of interest.
5.4 Discussion
ere are several questions one may raise with respect to our ex-
periment. First is the issue that we study the behavior of the PC
with respect to bidding and scoring papers only. Aer these steps
are complete, the SPC member conducts some discussion among
the reviewers, and the program chairs make a final decision. While
Section 5.3.4 suggests there may not be significant changes specif-
ically in how reviewers modify their scores during discussion, it is
nonetheless possible that during these stages, the final acceptance
decision may show unexpected behaviors. is is clearly an area
for further work. However, we have observed that the critical in-
puts to this final decision stage (score and rank of reviewers) are
impacted significantly by the reviewing model.
It is possible also that PC members behaved differently in our
seing than they would in a “pure” reviewing situation involving
only a single type of reviewing. For instance, single-blind review-
ers in our experiment were nonetheless presented with papers that
do not include author names and affiliations. We also mentioned
briefly in the call for papers that wewould experiment with double-
blind reviewing this year. We do not have a rigorous methodology
to estimate the nature of these biases, but we observe that at least
in the case of presenting anonymized PDFs to both types of review-
ers, it is plausible that this would cause us to under-estimate rather
than over-estimate the effects.
Having stated those caveats, we now discuss some issues with
respect to the practical implementation of double-blind reviewing.
5.4.1 Practical issues with double-blind reviewing. ere is a long-
standing question whether it is practical to anonymize a submis-
sion. is question depends on the nature of the field (for instance,
it would be impossible to anonymize work in a large and well-
known systems project). Hill et al. [5] argue that it is possible to
automatically identify authors in many cases based on the text of
the paper alone. However, other studies have observed that review-
ers’ guesses about authorship are oen wrong [21].
A second issue in the practical difficulty of retaining anonymity
in double-blind reviewing is the increasingly common practice of
publishing early versions of work on arXiv.org. For example,
this paper appeared on arXiv before being submied to any peer-
reviewed venue. is practice was a significant contributor to the
decision of the Journal of the American Economic Association to
abandon double-blind reviewing [6]. WSDM 2017 did not state
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a policy with regard to publishing pre-prints on arXiv, but when
asked, we discouraged but did not forbid such publication. In its
2016 call for papers [25], the NIPS machine learning conference,
which performs double-blind reviewing, informed authors that prior
submissions on arXiv are allowed, but reviewers are asked “not to
actively look for such submissions.” If reviewers happened to be
aware of the work, NIPS nonetheless allows the reviewing to pro-
ceed.
ese practical issues appear to be significant and unresolved.
6 META-ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the effect sizes reported in Table 5
to those reviewed in Section 2. We focus on 6 empirical stud-
ies: Tung [24], Knoblock-Westerwick et al. [7], Budden et al. [2],
Blank [1], Okike et al. [15] and Roberts and Verhoef [18]. By in-
cluding our work above, we have 7 studies total.
We report all effect sizes as log-odds multipliers. is choice
allows direct use of Table 5’s logistic regression coefficients, in-
volves modest recalculations for 3 of the other 6 studies, and is
reasonably interpretable. Two studies, Knoblock-Westerwick et al.
and Roberts and Verhoef, report t-statistics. For Tung, we have the
annual aggregates, so we can recover the t-statistic relative to the
binomial distribution. e method of Hasselblad and Hedges [4]
allows us to transform t-statistics into location shis of a continu-
ous logistic distribution,e result is interpretable on the log-odds
scale.
Table 8 presents all effects and their ranks. For famous authors
and top 50 institutions, the number of studies is small enough that
no study can be called an outlier. at said, for famous authors,
our value of 0.51 is actually smaller than that reported elsewhere,
while for top 50 institutions, our value of 0.46 is larger.
For the effect of female authors, the paern is almost uniformly
negative. e -0.25 effect reported in Table 5 ranks 7 out of 11, on
the small side, albeit this value is not qualitatively different from
the -0.246 combined effect of Budden et al. and the −0.229 effect of
Blank. By the standards of meta-analysis, in aggregate, the effect
against females authors can be considered statistically significant,
albeit with continuing caveats regarding the observational nature
of some of these studies.
In summary, the famous author effect we report is reported by
others as even larger. For the effect of female authors, we report
a value that is in line but somewhat smaller. Two interpretations
suggest themselves: First, we may be observing the natural varia-
tion among such studies. Alternately, relative to journal reviews,
the conference review process may operate with slightly different
biases, and social affiliation (famous authors, top 50 institutions,
and top companies) may play an enhanced role. Future research
should clarify this.
7 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the heart of our findings is that single-blind review-
ers make use of information about authors and institutions. Specif-
ically, single-blind reviewers bid less yet are differentially more
likely to bid on papers from top institutions, and more likely to
Source
Study
context
Method
Effect
size
Effect
rank
Famous author
Tung SIGMOD t → log odds 1.619 1
VLDB t → log odds 1.306 2
Okike et al. CORR log OR 1.136 3
Tomkins et al. WSDM logistic reg 0.506 4
Female author
Budden et al. BE log OR -0.426 2
BES log OR -0.119 10
AB log OR -0.224 8
BC log OR -0.398 4
JB log OR -0.048 11
LE log OR -0.370 5
all 6
journals
log OR -0.246 6
Knoblock-
Westerwick
et al.
2010 ICA t → log odds -0.410 3
Blank AER log OR -0.229 9
Roberts
and
Verhoef
EvoLang 11 t → log odds -1.186 1
Tomkins et al. WSDM logistic reg -0.25 7
Top 50 institutes
Blank AER log OR 0.020 2
Tomkins et al. WSDM logistic reg 0.46 1
Table 8: Across seven studies and 14 contexts, 17 effects as
log-odds multipliers.
recommend for acceptance papers from famous authors or top in-
stitutions, compared to their double-blind counterparts. Regard-
ing the gender effect the situation is more nuanced. Our results do
not show a statistically significant effect for gender, but our meta-
analysis places our findings in line with other experiments, which
in aggregate warrant a conclusion that the gender effect is signifi-
cant.
e primary ethical question is whether this behavior is okay.
In one interpretation, single-blind reviewers make use of prior in-
formation that may allow them to make beer overall judgments.
As a consequence, however, it may be that other work is disadvan-
taged, in the sense that two contributions of roughly equal merit
might be scored differently by single-blind reviewers, in favor of
the one from a top school, while double-blind reviewers may not
show this bias as strongly.
Clearly, our understanding of the implications of reviewing method-
ologies remains nascent. We feel that program and general chairs
of conferences should seriously consider the advantages of employ-
ing double-blind reviewing. Furthermore, we recommend that con-
ferences quantify and remain cognizant of inter-reviewer agree-
ment.
9
REFERENCES
[1] R. M. Blank. e effects of double-blind versus single-blind reviewing: Exper-
imental evidence from the american economic review. e American Economic
Review, pages 1041–1067, 1991.
[2] A. E. Budden, T. Tregenza, L. W. Aarssen, J. Koricheva, R. Leimu, and C. J. Lortie.
Double-blind review favours increased representation of female authors. Trends
in Ecology & Evolution, 23(1):4–6, 2008.
[3] E. Callaway. Open peer review finds more takers, 2016. [Online; accessed 30-
January-2017].
[4] V. Hasselblad and L. V. Hedges. Meta-analysis of screening and diagnostic tests.
Psychological bulletin, 117(1):167, 1995.
[5] S. Hill and F. Provost. e myth of the double-blind review?: Author identifica-
tion using only citations. SIGKDD Explor. Newsl., 5(2):179–184, Dec. 2003.
[6] S. Jaschik. Rejecting double blind, 2011. [Online; accessed 29-January-2017].
[7] S. Knobloch-Westerwick, C. J. Glynn, andM. Huge. eMatilda effect in science
communication. Science Communication, 35(5):603–625, 2013.
[8] N. Lawrence. Get Your NIPS Reviews in!
hp://inverseprobability.com/2015/07/23/get-your-nips-review-in, 2015.
[Online; accessed 29-January-2017].
[9] N. Lawrence. NIPS Experiment Analysis.
hp://inverseprobability.com/2015/03/30/nips-experiment-analysis, 2015.
[Online; accessed 29-January-2017].
[10] S. Madden and D. DeWi. Impact of double-blind reviewing on SIGMOD publi-
cation rates. SIGMOD Rec., 35(2):29–32, June 2006.
[11] K. S. McKinley. Improving publication quality by reducing bias with double-
blind reviewing and author response. ACM Sigplan Notices, 43(8):5–9, 2008.
[12] K. S. McKinley. More on improving reviewing quality with double-blind review-
ing, external review commiees, author response, and in person program com-
miee meetings. hp://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/mckinley/notes/blind.html,
2015.
[13] R. K. Merton. e Mahew effect in science. Science, 159(3810):56–63, 1968.
[14] Nature. Overview: Nature’s peer review trial, 2006. [Online; accessed 30-
January-2017].
[15] K. Okike, K. Hug, M. Kocher, and S. Leopold. Single-blind vs double-blind peer
review in the seing of author prestige. JAMA, 316(12):1315–1316, 2016.
[16] D. P. Peters and S. J. Ceci. Peer-review practices of psychological journals:
e fate of published articles, submied again. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
5(02):187–195, 1982.
[17] D. P. Peters and S. J. Ceci. e Peters & Ceci study of journal publications, 2014.
[Online; accessed 29-January-2017].
[18] S. G. Roberts and T. Verhoef. Double-blind reviewing at EvoLang 11 reveals
gender bias. Journal of Language Evolution, 1(2):163, 2016.
[19] P. M. Rothwell and C. N. Martyn. Reproducibility of peer review in clinical neu-
roscienceis agreement between reviewers any greater than would be expected
by chance alone? Brain, 123(9):1964, 2000.
[20] H. Schulzrinne. Double-blind reviewing: more placebo than miracle cure? ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 39(2):56–59, 2009.
[21] R. Snodgrass. Single-versus double-blind reviewing: an analysis of the literature.
ACM Sigmod Record, 35(3):8–21, 2006.
[22] R. T. Snodgrass. Editorial: Single-versus double-blind reviewing. ACM Transac-
tions on Database Systems (TODS), 32(1):1, 2007.
[23] A. Tomkins and M. Zhang. WSDM 2017 call for papers.
hp://www.wsdm-conference.org/2017/calls/papers/, 2017. [Online; accessed
29-January-2017].
[24] A. K. H. Tung. Impact of double blind reviewing on SIGMOD publication: A
more detail analysis. SIGMOD Rec., 35(3):6–7, Sept. 2006.
[25] U. von Luxburg and I. Guyon. NIPS 2016 call for papers.
hps://nips.cc/Conferences/2016/CallForPapers, 2016. [Online; accessed
13-February-2017].
[26] R. Walker and P. Rocha da Silva. Emerging trends in peer review—a survey.
Frontiers in Neuroscience, 9:169, 2015.
[27] T. J. Webb, B. O’Hara, and R. P. Freckleton. Does double-blind review benefit
female authors? Heredity, 77:282–291, 2008.
[28] WSDM. e ACM WSDM conference series.
hp://www.wsdm-conference.org/. [Online; accessed 29-January-2017].
A APPENDIX
A.1 Mechanism of Running the Experiment
Our experiment was performed using capabilities that already ex-
ist in EasyChair, plus a few last-minute changes provided by the
EasyChair team. e workflow within the EasyChair system to
perform the experiment relies on the use of a lile-used review-
ing model known as “External Review Commiee,” and runs as
follows:
(1) Disable subreviewers.
(2) Change reviewing model to ERC.
(3) Configure PC to see author names and ERC as double-
blind.
(4) Configure access to reviews for both PC and ERC as “see
only their own reviews.”
(5) Invite randomly split half of reviewers into PC and other
half into ERC.
(6) Invite or add senior as standard PC members
(7) Receive papers, perform do paper bidding.
(8) For Senior PC members and program chairs, configure at
most 0 papers assigned.
(9) Configure 2 papers per member for regular PC and ERC
members.
(10) Run automatic paper assignment separately for PC and
ERC.
(11) Assign papers to senior using interactive paper assignment.
(12) Run standard reviewing period for both PC and ERC.
(13) When reviewing is over, change all ERC members to stan-
dard PC members
(14) Change reviewing model from ERC to Senior PC.
(15) Change all SPC members from regular PC to SPC in the
new reviewing model.
(16) Change review access to PC members can see all reviews
for their papers.
(17) From now on, run discussion and decision process using
standard flows.
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